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ABSTRACT. Real-time information processing applications such as those enabling a more intelligent
infrastructure are increasingly focused on analyzing privacy-sensitive data obtained from individuals.
To produce accurate statistics about the habits of a population of users of a system, this data might
need to be processed through model-based estimators. Moreover, models of population dynamics,
originating for example from epidemiology or the social sciences, are often necessarily nonlinear.
Motivated by these trends, this paper presents an approach to design nonlinear privacy-preserving
model-based observers, relying on additive input or output noise to give differential privacy guar-
antees to the individuals providing the input data. For the case of output perturbation, contraction
analysis allows us to design convergent observers as well as set the level of privacy-preserving noise
appropriately. Two examples illustrate the approach: estimating the edge formation probabilities in a
dynamic social network, and syndromic surveillance relying on an epidemiological model.
1. INTRODUCTION
The possibility to analyze vast amounts of personal data capturing information about the activities
of private individuals is a foundational principle behind many current technology-driven trends such
as the “Internet of Things”, electronic biosurveillance systems, or developing an intelligent infras-
tructure enabling smart cities. In many respects however, the data collection practices envisioned
to operate these systems often go against basic privacy rights [2]. Concerns about the acquisition
and use of personal data by companies and governments, e.g., for potential price and service dis-
crimination, are rising [3, 4, 5], and could lead to people rejecting these technologies despite their
suggested benefits. Rigorous privacy-preserving data analysis methodologies are needed to support
regulations and allow people to appropriately trade off the privacy risks they increasingly incur with
the benefits they can expect in return.
Typically, large-scale monitoring and control systems only require aggregate statistics computed
from personal data streams, e.g., a dynamic map showing road traffic conditions built from location
traces sent by smartphones, or an estimate of power consumption in a neighborhood updated using
smart meter data from individual homes. Aggregation is beneficial to privacy, but past examples
have shown that it is not sufficient to a priori rule out the possibility of significant privacy breaches
[6, 7, 8]. Privacy attacks are often linkage attacks, where some newly published information is com-
bined with other available data to make new inferences about specific individuals, and predicting at
system design time how such attacks could be carried out is difficult. Yet, as explained below, it is
still possible to compute aggregate statistics with formal privacy guarantees for the individuals from
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whom the data originates, which could help alleviate some of the justified concerns and encourage
wider adoption of certain pervasive sensing and control systems.
Various information theoretic definitions have been proposed to capture quantitatively the con-
cept of privacy and are potentially applicable to the processing of data streams in real-time [9].
In this paper, we focus on the notion of differential privacy, which originates from the database
and cryptography literature [10]. Intuitively, a differentially private mechanism publishes infor-
mation about a dataset in a way that is not too sensitive to a single individual’s data. As a re-
sult, an individual receives a guarantee that by providing her data, she will not drastically change
the ability of a third party to make new inferences about her. Previous work has considered the
design of linear filters processing sensitive time series data with differential privacy guarantees
[11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. The problem studied in this paper is that of designing privacy-preserving
nonlinear model-based estimators, which to the best of our knowledge has not been studied in a gen-
eral setting before. A convenient way of achieving differential privacy for an estimator is to bound
its so-called sensitivity [10], a form of incremental system gain between the private input signals
and the published output [15]. Various tools could be used for this purpose, and here we rely on
contraction analysis [18, 19, 20, 21].
The rest of the paper is divided as follows. Section 2 presents the problem statement formally,
provides a brief introduction to the notion of differential privacy, and describes and compares
privacy-preserving data analysis mechanisms with input and output perturbations. In Section 3
we discuss some fundamental results in contraction analysis and present a type of “Input-to-State
Stability” property of contracting systems similar to the one proved in [19] but stated here for
discrete-time systems. This property is used in Section 4 to design differentially private observers
with output perturbation. The methodology is illustrated via two examples involving the analysis
of dynamic data originating from private individuals. In Section 5.1, we consider the problem of
estimating link formation probabilities in a dynamic social network, with a nonlinear measurement
model. In Section 5.2, we consider a nonlinear epidemiological model and design a differentially
private estimator of the proportion of susceptible and infectious people in a population, assuming a
syndromic data source.
Notation: In this paper, N := {0, 1, . . .} denotes the set of non-negative integers. ForH : X→ Y
a linear map between finite dimensional vector spaces X and Y equipped with the norms | · |X and
| · |Y respectively, we denote by ‖H‖YX its induced norm, so that |Hx|Y ≤ ‖H‖YX |x|X, for all x
in X. If X = Y and both spaces are equipped with the same norm | · |X, we simply write ‖ · ‖X.
For 1 ≤ p < ∞, the p-norm on Rn, denoted | · |p, is defined as |v|p := (
∑n
i=1 |vi|p)1/p, and
|v|∞ := max1≤i≤n |vi|. For v = {vk}k∈N a vector-valued discrete-time signal, where vk ∈ Rn
has components {vk,i}ni=1, the `p signal norm is ‖v‖p = (
∑∞
k=0
∑n
i=1 |vk,i|p)1/p = (
∑∞
k=0 |v|pp)1/p
for 1 ≤ p < ∞, and ‖v‖∞ = supk≥0 |vk|∞. We use diag(v) to denote a diagonal matrix with
the components of the vector v on the diagonal. For P a symmetric matrix, P positive definite is
denoted P  0 and P positive semidefinite is denoted P  0. For P  0, we denote its (unique)
positive semi-definite square root as P 1/2, i.e., P = P 1/2P 1/2. For P , Q symmetric matrices,
P  Q means P − Q  0, and P  0 means −P  0. The expressions “if and only if” and
“independent and identically distributed” are abbreviated as iff and iid respectively. C1 denotes
the set of continuously differentiable functions. A class K function β : R+ → R+ is a strictly
increasing continuous function such that β(0) = 0.
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2. PROBLEM STATEMENT
2.1. Observer Design. Consider the problem of estimating a discrete-time signal denoted x :=
{xk}k∈N, with xk ∈ X = Rn for some integer n, which represents an aggregate state for a popu-
lation of privacy-sensitive individuals. For example, xk could be the density at period k of drivers
or pedestrians at a finite number of spatial locations, the proportion of individuals infected by a dis-
ease in a population, etc. We assume that xk cannot be perfectly observed, but that we can measure
instead a privacy-sensitive discrete-time signal {yk}k∈N, with yk ∈ Y = Rm for some integer m,
for which we have a state-space model of the form
xk+1 = fk(xk) + wk,(2.1)
yk = gk(xk) + vk,(2.2)
where wk, vk are noise signals capturing modeling errors, and fk and gk are C1 functions. Our aim
is to publish an estimate zk of xk, computed from yk by an observer of the following form [22]
zk+1 = fk(zk) + hk(zk, yk − gk(zk)),(2.3)
with, for each k in N, hk : X×Y → X a C1 function such that hk(x, 0) = 0. We initialize (2.3) with
some estimate z0 of x0. Note that (2.3) could describe an observer for a model (2.1)-(2.2) that has
already been transformed under a suitable change of coordinates to a form that facilitates observer
design, e.g., an observability canonical form [23, 24]. With straightforward modifications to our
arguments, the “prediction” form (2.3) could also be replaced by an observer using the most recent
observations
z0 = z¯0 + h0(z¯0, y0 − gk(z¯0)), for some estimate z¯0 of x0,
zk+1 = fk(zk) + hk+1(zk, yk+1 − gk(fk(zk))), for k ≥ 0.(2.4)
In the applications discussed later in the paper, the signal yk is collected from privacy-sensitive
individuals, hence needs to be protected, in a sense defined below. On the other hand, the model
(2.1)-(2.3), i.e., the functions fk, gk and hk, is assumed to be publicly available, or at least poten-
tially known to any adversary trying to make inferences about y based on z. The data aggregator
wishes to publicly release the signal z produced by (2.3). However, since z depends on the sen-
sitive signal y, we only allow the release of an approximate version of z carrying certain privacy
guarantees, which are presented formally in the next subsection. As a result, it will emerge that the
functions hk need to be carefully chosen to balance accuracy or convergence speed of the observer
with the level of privacy offered.
Remark 1. We do not provide here nor use any model of the noise signals w and v in (2.1), (2.2),
which are simply introduced as a device to explain the discrepancy between any measured signal y
and the signals that can be predicted by a deterministic model xk+1 = fk(xk), yk = gk(xk).
Remark 2. More generally, we might just want to publish an output χk(xk), function of the state xk.
As explained below, this can be done by first obtaining a privacy-preserving estimate xˆ of the signal
x and then publishing χk(xˆk), relying on the fact that sound privacy guarantees such as differential
privacy are preserved by the final transformation through χk.
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2.2. Differential Privacy. The published signal should provide an accurate estimate of x under an
additional constraint that is not satisfied a priori by z from (2.3), aiming at preserving the privacy
of the individuals from which the measured signal y originates. More precisely, we impose that the
published signal be differentially private [10], which requires adding artificial noise somewhere in
the signal processing system to randomize the published output. A differentially private version of
the observer (2.3) should produce a randomized output signal whose distribution is not too sensitive
to certain variations associated with the effect of any individual’s data on the signal y, input of the
observer. The formal definition of differential privacy is given in Definition 1 below and requires that
we specify the type of variations in y that should be hard to detect from the published output. This
is done by defining a symmetric binary relation, called adjacency and denoted Adj, on the space of
datasets D of interest, here the space of signals y, so that two adjacent input signals y and y˜ should
produce (randomized) output signals with similar distributions. It is possible to define different
adjacency relations [15] to model different data analysis scenarios. In this paper, y is assumed
to represent a (possibly multi-dimensional) signal that already aggregates the data obtained from
multiple users, e.g., yk at a particular time period k could be the number of people waiting in a
hospital emergency room, the total power consumption of a group of homes during that period, etc.
We then consider in particular the following adjacency relations between signals
Adj(y, y˜) iff ‖y − y˜‖p ≤ Bp,(2.5)
for p = 1 or p = 2 and some given fixed constant Bp > 0, as well as the more restrictive adjacency
relation
Adj(y, y˜) iff ∃k0 ≥ 0 s.t.
{
yk = y˜k, k < k0
|yk − y˜k|p ≤ Kαk−k0 , k ≥ k0,
(2.6)
where again p = 1 or p = 2 and K > 0, 0 ≤ α < 1 are given fixed constants. In other words, we
aim at hiding deviations in the signal y (e.g., due to the contribution of one individual to the signal)
that are bounded in p-norm (relation (2.5)), or more explicitly that can start at any time k0 but then
subsequently decrease geometrically (relation (2.6)). Note that even the more restrictive condition
(2.6) is much more general than the adjacency relation considered in some previous work on the
design of a differentially private counter [11, 12, 14], where adjacent (scalar) signals can vary at a
single time period by at most one. In comparison, the adjacency condition (2.6) greatly enlarges the
set of signal deviations that can result from the presence of any individual and for which we provide
guarantees (deviation at a single period is obtained for α = 0). We can now state the definition of a
differentially private mechanism, i.e., of a randomized map from input to output signals.
Definition 1. Let D be a space equipped with a symmetric binary relation denoted Adj, and let
(R,M) be a measurable space, whereM is a given σ-algebra over R. Let , δ ≥ 0. A randomized
mechanism M from D to R is (, δ)-differentially private (for Adj) if for all d, d′ ∈ D such that
Adj(d, d′), we have
P(M(d) ∈ S) ≤ eP(M(d′) ∈ S) + δ, ∀S ∈M.(2.7)
If δ = 0, the mechanism is said to be -differentially private.
This definition quantifies the admissible deviations for the output distribution of a differentially
private mechanism, when a variation at the input satisfies the adjacency relation. Smaller values of 
and δ correspond to stronger privacy guarantees. In this paper, the space D was defined as the space
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of input signals y, the adjacency relation considered is (2.5) or (2.6), and the output space R is the
space of output signals for the observer, here XN since we wish to estimate x. The problem is to
publish an accurate estimate of the state x while satisfying the property of Definition 1 for specified
values of  and δ.
Remark 3. Definition 1 depends on the choice of σ-algebraM, which must contain enough sets S
to provide a meaningful differential privacy guarantee. The interested reader can find a discussion
of measurability issues in a previous paper[15].
2.3. Sensitivity and Basic Differentially Private Mechanisms. Enforcing differential privacy can
be done by randomly perturbing the published output of a system [10, 15], at the expense of its
quality or utility. Hence, we are interested in evaluating as precisely as possible the amount of noise
necessary to make a mechanism differentially private. For this purpose, the following quantity plays
an important role.
Definition 2. Let q ≥ 1. The `q-sensitivity of a system G with m inputs and n outputs with respect
to an adjacency relation Adj is defined by ∆qG = supAdj(u,u’) ‖Gu−Gu′‖q.
In practice we are interested in the sensitivity of a system for the cases q = 1 and q = 2. The
basic mechanisms of Theorem 1 below (with proofs and references in a previous paper[15]), can be
used to produce differentially private signals. First, we need the following definitions. A zero-mean
Laplace random variable with parameter b has the probability density function exp(−|x|/b)/2b,
and its variance is 2b2. The Q-function is defined as Q(x) := 1√
2pi
∫∞
x e
−u2
2 du. Then, for  > 0,
0.5 ≥ δ > 0, let K = Q−1(δ) and define κδ, = 12(K +
√
K2 + 2), which can be shown to
behave roughly as O
(√
ln(1/δ)/
)
.
Theorem 1. Let G be a system with m inputs and n outputs, and fix a relation Adj in Definition 2.
The mechanismMu = Gu+w, where allwk,i, k ∈ N, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, are independent Laplace random
variables with parameter b ≥ (∆1G)/, is -differentially private for Adj. If w is instead a white
Gaussian noise such that the covariance matrix of each sample wk is σ2In with σ ≥ κδ, ∆2G, then
the mechanism is (, δ)-differentially private.
The mechanisms of Theorem 1 are called the Laplace and the Gaussian mechanism. One reason
for introducing the Gaussian mechanism is that typically the `2-sensitivity is smaller than its `1
counterpart, which leads to lower noise levels if one can tolerate δ > 0 in the privacy guarantee.
2.4. Input and Output Perturbation. Theorem 1 says that we can obtain a differentially private
signal at the output of a system G by adding noise with standard deviation proportional to ∆1G/
or to κδ,∆2G. A very useful additional result stated here informally says that post-processing a
differentially private signal without re-accessing the privacy-sensitive input signal does not change
the differential privacy guarantee [15]. Now, the system G in Theorem 1 can simply be the identity,
with `1- and `2- sensitivity for the adjacency relation (2.6) equal to K/(1 − α) and K/
√
1− α2
respectively (and B1 and B2 for (2.5)). This immediately gives a first possible design approach
for our privacy-preserving observer, simply adding Laplace or Gaussian noise directly to the input
signal y, see Fig. 1 a). The observer can then be designed according to any desired methodology,
and should try to mitigate the effect of the artificial input noise, whose distribution is known, in
addition to the usual measurement error. We call this design an input perturbation mechanism. Note
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FIGURE 1. Gaussian mechanisms with input (a) and output (b) perturbation for the
adjacency relation (2.6). nk represents a zero-mean standard white Gaussian noise
with identity covariance matrix. Dashed lines represent a differentially private sig-
nal.
that for α close to 1, 1/
√
1− α2 is significantly smaller than 1/(1 − α), so that if we are willing
to accept some δ > 0 in the privacy guarantee and to use the 2-norm on Y in the adjacency relation
(2.6), we can obtain much better accuracy by using the `2-sensitivity.
The input perturbation mechanism is attractive for its simplicity and might perform well, espe-
cially with low privacy level requirements (high , δ). In particular, the sensitive data can be made
differentially private at the source, before sending it to any third party for processing. However, it
can also potentially exhibit the following drawbacks. First, the noise added to y might be unneces-
sarily large because it is not tailored to the task of estimating the state x of the model (2.1)-(2.2),
and does not take into account the temporal correlations between samples of the signal y captured
by this model. Significant noise at the input of the observer can also lead to poor performance, i.e.,
slow convergence and large errors in the state estimate, or even perhaps divergence of the estimate
from the true state trajectory, since the convergence of nonlinear observers is often local. Second,
characterizing the output error (state estimation error) due to the privacy-preserving noise requires
understanding how this noise is transformed when passing through the nonlinear observer. In gen-
eral, for nonlinear systems, the noise distribution at the output can become multimodal and non-zero
mean, and hence the observer could produce a systematically biased estimate that could be hard to
correct.
An alternative to input perturbation is the output perturbation mechanism shown on Fig. 1 b). In
this case, following Theorem 1, a privacy-preserving noise signal proportional to the sensitivity of
the observer G is added at its output. Computing the sensitivity of G, or in practice upper bounding
it, should be done as accurately as possible to reduce the conservatism of the approach. On the other
hand the output noise does not impact any stability or bias analysis of the observer G. As discussed
in more details in the following sections, we should then try to design an observer that has both
good tracking performance for the state trajectory and low sensitivity, in order to minimize the level
of privacy-preserving noise necessary at the output. These two desired properties are essentially in
conflict. Fig. 1 b) shows that we can also add a terminal filter to smooth out the Laplace or Gaussian
noise[25], although this can generally affect the transient performance of the overall system (e.g.,
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its convergence speed). We do not discuss the design of a potential smoothing filter in this paper,
except briefly in Subsection 5.1.
Example 1. Consider the memoryless system yk 7→ φ(yk) := y2k, which could be a simple state
estimator for a measurement model yk =
√
xk in (2.2), which does not take the dynamics (2.1)
into account. Consider the adjacency relation (2.6) for α = 0, so that we have a deviation at
some (unknown) single time period k0 of at most K between adjacent signals yk and y˜k. For the
input perturbation scheme and the Gaussian mechanism, assuming for simplicity that κδ, = 1, the
signal zk = (yk + Kξk)2 = y2k + 2Kykξk + K
2ξ2k is differentially private when ξ is a standard
Gaussian white noise. The privacy-preserving noise at the input induces a systematic bias at the
output between zk and y2k equal to E[2Kykξk +K2ξ2k] = K2. Since K is assumed publicly known,
in this case the bias can be compensated and a better approximation of φ that is still differentially
private is z′k = (yk + Kξk)
2 − K2. One can verify that the variance of the remaining error is
e′k = E[(z′k − y2k)2] = 4K2y2k + 2K4.
Suppose we know in addition that yk ∈ [0, 1] for all k ≥ 0. Then we can bound the sensitivity of
the memoryless system as
(2.8) ∆2φ = |y2k0 − y˜2k0 | = |yk0 − y˜k0 ||yk0 + y˜k0 | ≤ 2|yk0 − y˜k0 | ≤ 2K.
Hence, the signal z′′k = y
2
k + 2Kξk is also differentially private and unbiased, with ξ a standard
white Gaussian noise as before. The variance of the error is e′′k = E[(z′′k − y2k)2] = 4K2, which
is smaller than the worst case value 4K2 + 2K4 for e′k. However, e
′′
k is larger than e
′
k as soon as
yk <
√
1−K2/2, the typical case since K should be much less than 1, otherwise both the input
and output mechanisms essentially destroy the signal. The upper bound (2.8) on the sensitivity
is conservative in order to be independent of the actual values of the sensitive signal y, which is
necessary when Theorem 1 is used to provide a differential privacy guarantee.
In the rest of the paper we focus on the output perturbation mechanism of Fig. 1 b). There
are two aspects to the differentially private observer design problem in this case. First, we need
to enforce appropriate convergence of z toward x, which is the observer design problem itself.
Second, we also need to control and bound explicitly the magnitude of the changes in z when the
observer input changes from y to an adjacent signal y˜, in order to apply Theorem 1 and set the output
noise level providing the differential privacy guarantee. In this paper, both aspects of the problem
are treated by using contraction analysis to design the observer as well as quantify its sensitivity to
variations in the measured signal y. A motivation for this approach is the exponential convergence of
trajectories of contractive systems toward each other, which provides a degree of robustness against
input disturbances [18, 19, 26, 27] and, as a consequence, sensitivity bounds for variations in input
data streams y. The next section provides some background on contraction analysis, necessary to
describe our design approach in Section 4.
3. CONTRACTING SYSTEMS
Contraction analysis is an “incremental” stability analysis methodology for dynamical systems
emphasizing convergence of trajectories toward each other, popularized in particular by the work
of Lohmiller and Slotine [18]. Earlier related work can also be found in the mathematics literature
[28, 29]. Contraction and incremental stability analysis have seen significant developments in the
past two decades [18, 21, 30, 31, 26, 32, 19, 20], and we refer the reader to the recent paper by
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Forni and Sepulchre [20] for a comparison of different variations that have emerged and additional
references. The purpose of this section is to review some aspects of this methodology for discrete-
time systems, which are not emphasized as much as continuous-time systems in the literature, and
to state and prove some results that we rely on to design differentially private observers with output
perturbation. Although these results could potentially be derived from the ideas presented in some
of the references cited above, we provide here a self-contained discussion and in particular explicit
bounds on distances between trajectories that are necessary to precisely set the level of privacy-
preserving noise, since qualitative guarantees of incremental convergence are insufficient.
3.1. Basic Results. Consider a discrete-time system
(3.1) xk+1 = fk(xk),
with fk : X→ X a C1 function, for all k ∈ N. Let us denote by φ(k; k0, x0) the value at time k ≥ k0
of the solution of (3.1) taking the value x0 at time k0. A forward invariant set for the system (3.1)
is a set C ⊂ X such that if x0 ∈ C, then for all k0 and all k ≥ k0, φ(k; k0, x0) ∈ C. Although
we assume in this paper X = Rn, it is useful to introduce here some language from differential
geometry and view X more generally as an n-dimensional differentiable manifold[33, 20]. For each
point x ∈ X, the tangent space to X at x, i.e., informally, the n-dimensional vector space of all
tangent vectors to curves on X passing through x, is denoted TxX. The tangent bundle of X is
denoted TX := ∪x∈X{x} × TxX, and is equipped with a time-varying family of norms | · |[x,k],
smoothly varying with x, so that | · |[x,k] is a norm on TxX, for all k ∈ N. For each x, x˜ ∈ X,
let Γ(x, x˜) be the set of piecewise C1 curves joining x and x˜, i.e., functions γ : [0, 1] → X with
γ(0) = x, γ(1) = x˜. We define the (time-varying) length of such a curve γ by
Lk(γ) =
∫ 1
0
|γ′(r)|[γ(r),k]dr,
where γ′(r) := dγdr (r). We then have a notion of (time-varying) geodesic distance on X, defined as
dk(x, x˜) = inf
γ∈Γ(x,x˜)
Lk(γ), ∀x, x˜ ∈ X.(3.2)
Moreover, if the norms | · |[x,k] are in fact independent of x, thus denoted | · |[k], and if X is a
convex set in Rn (possibly equal to Rn), then the infimum in (3.2) is achieved by straight lines
γ(r) = x + r(x˜ − x) and dk(x, x˜) = |x˜ − x|[k] in (3.2). Finally, each function fk in (3.1) is
associated to a Jacobian Fk(x) :=
∂fk
∂x (x), which defines a linear map from TxX at time k to
Tfk(x)X at time k + 1. As a result, for all vectors v ∈ TxX,
|Fk(x) v|[fk(x),k+1] ≤ ‖Fk(x)‖[fk(x),k+1][x.k] |v|[x,k],(3.3)
where ‖ · ‖[f(x),k+1][x.k] denotes the norm induced by | · |[x,k] and | · |[fk(x),k+1].
Remark 4. The discussion could be carried out in a slightly more general framework by allowing
asymmetric norms on the tangent spaces[20] rather than standard norms, but we will not need this
level of generality.
Definition 3. Let ρ be a nonnegative constant. The system (3.1) is said to be ρ-contracting for the
norms | · |[x,k] on a forward invariant set C ⊂ X if for any k0 ∈ N and any two initial conditions
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x0, x˜0 ∈ C, we have, for all k ≥ k0,
dk(φ(k; k0, x0), φ(k; k0, x˜0)) ≤ ρk−k0dk0(x0, x˜0).(3.4)
Let γk ∈ Γ(x, x˜) be a curve joining two points x and x˜ in X at a fixed time k. Let γ′k(r) be the
tangent vector to γk at the point γk(r), for r ∈ [0, 1]. The curve γk is transported at time k by (3.1)
to a curve γk+1 joining fk(x) and fk(x˜). Taking the derivative with respect to r in the equation
γk+1(r) = fk(γk(r)), we obtain the important linear relation between tangent vectors
γ′k+1(r) = Fk(γk(r)) γ
′
k(r), ∀r ∈ [0, 1],∀k ≥ 0.(3.5)
The following fundamental theorem of contraction analysis is then a consequence of (3.5).
Theorem 2. Let Fk = ∂fk∂x be the Jacobian of fk, for all k ≥ 0. A sufficient condition for the system
(3.1) to be ρ-contracting for the norms | · |[x,k] on a forward invariant set C ⊂ X is that
‖Fk(x)‖[fk(x),k+1][x.k] ≤ ρ, ∀x ∈ C,∀k ∈ N.(3.6)
Proof. Consider a curve γk0 : [0, 1] → X in Γ(x0, x˜0). This curve is transported by (3.1) to a
sequence of curves γk0+1, γk0+2, . . ., i.e., γk+1(r) = fk(γk(r)), for all r ∈ [0, 1], with γk joining
φ(k; k0, x0) and φ(k; k0, x˜0). We have, for all k ≥ k0, using (3.5)
Lk+1(γk+1) =
∫ 1
0
|γ′k+1(r)|[γk+1(r),k+1]dr =
∫ 1
0
|Fk(γk(r)) γ′k(r)|[γk+1(r),k+1]dr.
Now, using (3.3) and then the assumption (3.6)
Lk+1(γk+1) ≤
∫ 1
0
‖Fk(γk(r))‖[γk+1(r),k+1][γk(r),k] |γ
′
k(r)|[γk(r),k]dr ≤ ρ
∫ 1
0
|γ′k(r)|[γk(r),k]dr = ρLk(γk),
(3.7)
and hence by immediate recursion, Lk(γk) ≤ ρk−k0Lk0(γk0). To conclude, let  > 0 and take the
curve γk0 above to satisfy
Lk0(γk0) ≤ (1 + )dk0(x0, x˜0).
Then, since γk ∈ Γ(φ(k; k0, x0), φ(k; k0, x˜0)), we have
(3.8) dk(φ(k; k0, x0), φ(k; k0, x˜0)) ≤ Lk(γk) ≤ ρk−k0Lk0(γk0) ≤ (1 + )ρk−k0dk0(x0, x˜0).
Since this inequality is true for all  > 0, (3.4) holds. 
Remark 5. Note that to obtain useful results in continuous time (in particular, to detect convergent
dynamics), it is crucial to use a tighter inequality replacing the first inequality of (3.7) by Coppel’s
inequality [34] to bound the solutions of linear differential equations. This leads to a sufficient
condition for continuous-time systems similar to (3.6) stated in terms of matrix measures instead of
induced norms [18, 32, 19]. However, this does not apply to discrete-time systems.
Corollary 1. With the notation defined as in Theorem 2, suppose that C is a convex forward invari-
ant subset of Rn and that the norms | · |[x,k] on the tangent spaces are independent of x and denoted
| · |k. Let ‖ · ‖k+1k be the matrix norm induced by | · |k and | · |k+1. Then, if ‖Fk(x)‖k+1k ≤ ρ for all
x ∈ C and for all k ∈ N, we have
|φ(k; k0, x0)− φ(k; k0, x˜0)|k ≤ ρk−k0 |x0 − x˜0|k0 , ∀x0, x˜0 ∈ C,∀k ≥ k0.
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Proof. The result follows immediately from Theorem 2 and the remarks on geodesic distances pre-
ceding Definition 3. 
Corollary 2. With the notation defined as in Theorem 2, suppose that the norms on the tangent
spaces are defined for all x and k by |v|[x,k] = |P[x,k]v|1, where P[x,k] = diag(p[x,k]), with p[x,k]
a vector with positive components p[x,k],i. Hence, |v|[x,k] =
∑n
i=1 p[x,k],i|vi|. Then the system is
ρ-contracting for the associated distances on X if the following linear programs are feasible, for all
x ∈ C and k ∈ N
n∑
i=1
p[fk(x),k+1],i|Fk,ij(x)| ≤ ρ p[x,k],j , ∀1 ≤ j ≤ n,(3.9)
p[x,k],i, p[fk(x),k+1],i > 0, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n.(3.10)
In particular, if C is convex and if there exist positive vectors p[k] independent of x satisfying the
above inequalities (3.9), (3.10) for all x, k, then, with P[k] := diag(p[k]), xk := φ(k; k0, x0),
x˜k := φ(k; k0, x˜0)), we have
|P[k](xk − x˜k)|1 ≤ ρk−k0 |P[k0](x0 − x˜0)|1, ∀x0, x˜0 ∈ C,∀k ≥ k0.(3.11)
Proof. The inequalities (3.9), (3.10) come from satisfying (3.6) for the 1-norms weighted by R :=
P[x,k] and S := P[fk(x),k+1]. The condition (3.6) is equivalent to the induced 1-norm of the matrix
SFk(x)R
−1 being less than ρ, and this matrix has entries p[fk(x),k+1],iFk,ij(x)/p[x,k],j . The induced
1-norm of an n × m matrix A = [aij ]i,j is max1≤j≤m
∑n
i=1 |aij |. The result follows from these
facts. 
Corollary 3. With the notation defined as in Theorem 2, suppose that the norms on the tangent
spaces are defined by |v|[x,k] = (vTP[x,k]v)1/2 = |P 1/2[x,k]v|2, where P[x,k]  0, for all x and k.
Then the system is ρ-contracting for the associated distances on X if the following Linear Matrix
Inequalities (LMIs) are satisfied
(3.12) Fk(x)TP[f(x),k+1]Fk(x)  ρ2P[x,k], ∀x ∈ C,∀k ∈ N.
Suppose C is convex. If there exist matrices P[k]  0, k ∈ N, independent of x, satisfying these
LMIs, then we have
(3.13) |P 1/2[k] (xk − x˜k)|2 ≤ ρk−k0 |P
1/2
[k0]
(x0 − x˜0)|2, ∀x0, x˜0 ∈ C,∀k ≥ k0,
where xk := φ(k; k0, x0), x˜k := φ(k; k0, x˜0)). If there exist matrices P[x,k] satisfying (3.12) and
if there there exist 2 matrices Pmin  0 with minimum eigenvalue λmin > 0 and Pmax  0 with
maximum eigenvalue λmax > 0 such that we have λminI  Pmin  P[x,k]  Pmax  λmaxI , for
all x, k, then
|P 1/2min(xk − x˜k)|2 ≤ ρk−k0 |P 1/2max(x0 − x˜0)|2, ∀x0, x˜0 ∈ C,∀k ≥ k0,
and hence
|xk − x˜k|2 ≤ ρk−k0
√
λmax
λmin
|x0 − x˜0|2.
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Proof. This is a corollary of Theorem 2, since satisfying (3.6) for the norm induced by the weighted
2-norms with matricesP[x,k] andP[f(x),k+1] can be written vTFk(x)TP[f(x),k+1]Fk(x)v ≤ ρ2 vTP[x,k]v,
for all v in Rn. The second part uses the fact∫ 1
0
√
γ′(r)Pmaxγ′(r)dr ≥ Lk(γ) =
∫ 1
0
√
γ′(r)P[γ(r),k]γ′(r)dr ≥
∫ 1
0
√
γ′(r)Pminγ′(r)dr,
and moreover
∫ 1
0
√
γ′(r)Pminγ′(r)dr ≥ |P 1/2min(x − x˜)|2 if γ ∈ Γ(x, x˜), since for a constant norm
on Rn the geodesic curves are straight lines. Finally, referring to (3.8), we get
|P 1/2min(xk − x˜k)|2 ≤ Lk(γk) ≤ ρk−k0Lk0(γk0) ≤ ρk−k0 |P 1/2max(x0 − x˜0)|2.

Remark 6. Corollary 3 is the classical contraction result [18], in discrete time, for norms associated
with an inner product (Riemannian structure on X). Using state-dependent P matrices can enlarge
the set of systems for which we can prove contraction, but in our case we also need to explicitly
bound the Euclidean distances |xk− x˜k|2, not just general geodesic distances, to be able to evaluate
the level of noise necessary for the Gaussian mechanism of Theorem 1.
3.2. Effect of Disturbances. For the computation of `1 and `2-sensitivities, we need to study the
trajectory deviations of contracting system subject to disturbances. Qualitatively, the exponential
convergence of trajectories of a contracting system provides some robustness against disturbances[27,
18, 19]. However, to precisely set the level of privacy-preserving noise, quantitative worst case
bounds on the `1 or `2-norms of the trajectory deviations are needed. Hence, consider a system
(3.14) xk+1 = fk(xk, pik(xk)),
where pik : X → P := Rp, for some p, represents a C1 disturbance signal, and for all k ≥ 0,
fk : X×P→ X is C1. We equip the tangent spaces of the product manifold X×P with time-varying
norms that for simplicity are assumed to be fixed for the disturbance part, i.e., |(v, w)|[(x,pi),k] =
|v|[x,k] + |w|P, for a fixed norm | · |P. The nominal system under zero disturbance is
(3.15) x¯k+1 = fk(x¯k, 0).
We denote ∂fk∂x and
∂fk
∂pi the Jacobian of fk(x, pi) with respect to the components of x and pi respec-
tively. For r ∈ [0, 1], denote by φ(k; r, k0, x0) the iterates of
(3.16) xk+1 = fk(xk, r pik(xk)),
starting from x0 at time k0. Note that (3.14) corresponds to r = 1 and (3.15) to r = 0. Let us also
define
Jk(x; r) :=
∂fk
∂x
(x, r pik(x)) + r
∂fk
∂pi
(x, r pik(x))
∂pik
∂x
(x), ∀x ∈ X,∀r ∈ [0, 1].(3.17)
For all x in X, denote xk,r+ := fk(x, r pik(x)). Formally, the “differential” maps (3.17) are from
T[x,k]X to T[xk,r+ ,k+1]
X, with the corresponding induced norms ‖ · ‖[x
k,r
+ ,k+1]
[x,k] . We then have the
following result.
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Theorem 3. Consider a trajectory x¯k := φ(k; 0, k0, x¯0) for (3.15) starting from x¯0 and a trajectory
xk := φ(k; 1, k0, x0) for the perturbed system (3.14) starting from x0. We suppose that there exists
a sequence {Mk}k≥0 such that
(3.18)
∣∣∣∣∂fk∂pi (x, r pik(x))pik(x)
∣∣∣∣
[xk,r+ ,k+1]
≤Mk, ∀r ∈ [0, 1], ∀x ∈ C,∀k ≥ k0,
and that
(3.19) ‖Jk(x; r)‖[x
k,r
+ ,k+1]
[x,k] ≤ ρ, ∀r ∈ [0, 1],∀x ∈ C,∀k ≥ k0,
where C is a forward invariant set for (3.16), for all r ∈ [0, 1]. Then we have, for all k ≥ k0, and
the distances dk defined in (3.2),
dk(x¯k, xk) ≤ ρk−k0dk0(x¯k0 , xk0) +
k−k0−1∑
l=0
ρlMk−1−l.
Remark 7. As an example, in the case of additive disturbances on X = P = Rn, i.e.,
(3.20) fk(x, pik(x)) = f˜k(x) + pik(x),
with a fixed norm | · | on Rn, the condition (3.18) can be written more simply supx∈C |pik(x)| ≤Mk.
Remark 8. Note that if the disturbance pik does not depend on x, then (3.17) reads Jk(x; r) :=
∂fk
∂x (x, r pik) and (3.19) is a type of contraction condition on the perturbed system. If moreover the
perturbation is in fact additive as in (3.20), then (3.19) simply asks that the Jacobian of the nominal
system f˜k satisfy the contraction assumption.
Proof. Consider a curve γk0 ∈ Γ(x¯0, x0), i.e., such that γk0(0) = x¯0 and γk0(1) = x0, transported
by (3.16) to the sequence
γk(r) = φ(k; r, k0, γk0(r)), ∀r ∈ [0, 1], ∀k ≥ k0.
Then, for k ≥ k0, we have γk ∈ Γ(x¯k, xk), where x¯k := φ(k; 0, k0, x¯0) and xk := φ(k; 1, k0, x0).
Following the idea of the proof of Theorem 2, define γ′k(r) :=
d
drφ(k; r, k0, γk0(r)), so that we
have, for all k and all r ∈ [0, 1]
γ′k+1(r) = Jk(γk(r); r) γ
′
k(r) +
∂fk
∂pi
(γk(r), r pik(γk(r)))pik(γk(r)),
which implies, by (3.19) and (3.18),
|γ′k+1(r)|[γk+1(r),k+1] ≤ ρ |γ′k(r)|[γk(r),k] +Mk, ∀r ∈ [0, 1], ∀k ≥ k0,
and by integration over r ∈ [0, 1]
Lk+1(γk+1) ≤ ρLk(γk) +Mk, ∀k ≥ k0.
By the comparison lemma [35], we then have that L(γk) ≤ uk for uk satisfying the linear scalar
dynamics
uk0 = Lk0(γk0), uk+1 = ρ uk +Mk, ∀k ≥ k0.
Hence, Lk(γk) ≤ ρk−k0uk0 +
∑k−k0−1
l=0 ρ
lMk−1−l. As in the end of the proof of Theorem 2, we
can then choose γk0 so that Lk0(γk0) is arbitrarily close to dk0(x¯0, x0), and then use dk(x¯k, xk) ≤
Lk(γk) to conclude. 
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We can now make convergence assumptions on the bounding sequence {Mk}k≥0 in (3.18) to
state more concrete results. The following corollaries follow by straightforward calculations on the
sequence uk introduced at the end of the proof of Theorem 3.
Corollary 4. Let 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞ be an integer. Suppose that {Mk}k≥0 in (3.18) is a sequence in `p,
with norm ‖M‖p. Then, with the notation and assumptions of Theorem (3), if ρ < 1, there exists a
class K function β : R+ → R+ such that
(3.21)
 ∞∑
k=k0
dk(x¯k, xk)
p
1/p ≤ β(dk0(x0, x¯0)) + ‖M‖p1− ρ ,
where, for p =∞, the left-hand side of the inequality is interpreted as usual as supk≥k0 dk(x¯k, xk).
By further restricting the class of disturbances, we get slightly tighter bounds on the deviations
for p ≥ 2.
Corollary 5. Let 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞ be an integer. Suppose that {Mk}k≥0 in (3.18) satisfies the following
condition:
(3.22) ∃K ≥ 0, 1 > α ≥ 0, and k0 ∈ N s.t. Mk =
{
0, if k < k0,
Kαk−k0 , if k ≥ k0.
Then, with the notation and assumptions of Theorem 3, for k ≥ k0,
dk(x¯k, xk) ≤ ρk−k0dk0(x¯0, x0) +K
ρk−k0 − αk−k0
ρ− α .
Hence, if ρ < 1,
∞∑
k=k0
dk(x¯k, xk) ≤ 1
1− ρdk0(x¯0, x0) +
K
(1− ρ)(1− α) ,
and for any p ≥ 2, there exists a class K function β : R+ → R+ such that
(3.23)
 ∞∑
k=k0
dk(x¯k, xk)
p
1/p ≤ β(dk0(x¯0, x0)) + K|ρ− α|
( ∞∑
k=0
|ρk − αk|p
)1/p
.
Remark 9. If the norms on TX are given by weighted 1 and 2-norms as in Corollaries 2 and 3,
then condition (3.19) corresponds to the feasibility of a family of linear programs or LMIs, and if
moreover C is convex and the weight matrices in these norms are independent of x, then we can
replace the distances dk(x¯k, xk) in (3.21), (3.23) by |P[k](x¯k − xk)|1 or |P 1/2[k] (x¯k − xk)|2 as in
(3.11), (3.13).
4. DIFFERENTIALLY PRIVATE OBSERVERS WITH OUTPUT PERTURBATION
Let us now return to our initial differentially private observer design problem with output pertur-
bation. Two adjacent measured signals y and y˜ produce distinct observer state trajectories z and z˜
by (2.3), such that
zk+1 = fk(zk) + hk(zk, yk − gk(zk)),(4.1)
z˜k+1 = fk(z˜k) + hk(z˜k, yk − gk(z˜k) + pik),(4.2)
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where pik = y˜k−yk. We can now attempt to choose the functions hk to design a contractive observer,
while at the same time minimizing the “gain” of the map pi → z. First, contraction provides a notion
of convergence for the observer. Namely, if the model (2.1), (2.2) were valid under no modeling
noise assumptions (zero v, w), then any the sequence x satisfying (2.1), (2.2) would also satisfy the
dynamics (4.1) (since yk = g(xk)), and the trajectories x, z would converge exponentially toward
each other, so that any initial difference between z0 and x0 would eventually be forgotten. Second,
the results of Section 3.2 give us tools to bound the sensitivity of contractive observers, i.e., the
deviations between z and z˜ above, and hence a means to set the level of privacy-preserving noise
using Theorem 1.
Given two measured signals y and y˜, define the notation νy,y˜k (x; r) := yk − gk(x) + rpik =
(1− r)yk + ry˜k − gk(x) and
(4.3) Jy,y˜k (x; r) =
∂fk
∂x
(x) +
∂hk
∂x
(x, νy,y˜k (x; r))−
∂hk
∂y
(x, νy,y˜k (x; r))
∂gk
∂x
(x).
The proof of the following proposition follows immediately from Theorem 3 and Remark 8.
Proposition 1. Consider the observer (2.3), and two measured signals y, y˜ producing respectively
the trajectories z, z˜, assuming the same initial condition z0 = z˜0 to initialize the observer. Suppose
that we have the bound
(4.4) ‖Jy,y˜k (x; r)‖
[xk,r+ ,k+1]
[x,k] ≤ ρ, ∀r ∈ [0, 1], ∀x ∈ C,∀k ∈ N,
where Jy,y˜k is defined by (4.3), x
k,r
+ := fk(x)+hk(x, ν
y,y˜
k (x; r)) and C is a set containing z0, which
is forward invariant for the observer (4.1) for any input signal (1 − r)y + ry˜, r ∈ [0, 1]. Suppose
moreover
(4.5) sup
x∈C,r∈[0,1]
∣∣∣∣∂hk∂y (x, νy,y˜k (x; r))(y˜k − yk)
∣∣∣∣
[xk,r+ ,k+1]
≤Mk, ∀k ∈ N.
Then, we have, for the distances dk associated to the norms | · |[x,k]
dk(zk, z˜k) ≤
k−1∑
l=0
ρlMk−1−l.
The result of Proposition 1 is still quite general. To illustrate how it can be applied and to simplify
the following discussion, let us focus on the simpler case of Luenberger-type observers
(4.6) zk+1 = fk(zk) +Hk × (yk − gk(zk)),
where Hk represents a n × m matrix to design. In other words, we set hk(x, y) = Hk y. Then
the expression (4.3) reads simply ∂fk∂x (x) − Hk ∂gk∂x (x) and becomes in particular independent of
r and y, y˜. Next, fix a norm | · |X on TX, independent of x, k, and a p-norm | · |p on Y, and
let H¯Xp := supk ‖Hk‖XY. Then, in (4.5), we can take Mk = H¯Xp |yk − y˜k|p. This leads to the
following corollary of Proposition 1, similar to the Corollaries 4 and 5, which we will use next in
the illustrative examples. We introduce the notation ‖v‖p,X :=
(∑∞
k=0 |vk|pX
)1/p, for 1 ≤ p ≤ ∞.
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Corollary 6. Consider the observer (4.6), and two measured signals y, y˜ producing respectively
the trajectories z, z˜, assuming the same initial condition z0 = z˜0 to initialize the observer. Fix the
norms | · |X, on TX, independent of x, k. Suppose that we have the bound
(4.7)
∥∥∥∥∂fk∂x (x)−Hk ∂gk∂x (x)
∥∥∥∥
X
≤ ρ, ∀x ∈ C, k ∈ N,
for some constant ρ < 1, where C is a set containing z0 and forward invariant for (4.1) for any
input signal y + (1 − r)y˜, r ∈ [0, 1]. Then, if the signals y, y˜ are adjacent according to (2.5), we
have, for the same value of p,
(4.8) ‖z − z˜‖p,X ≤
Bp H¯
X
p
1− ρ .
Moreover, if the signals y, y˜ are in fact adjacent according to (2.6), we have more precisely, for the
same value of p,
(4.9) ‖z − z˜‖p,X ≤
K H¯Xp
|ρ− α|
( ∞∑
k=0
|ρk − αk|p
)1/p
.
Remark 10. For the adjacency relation (2.6) with p = 1, both (4.9) and (4.8) give the same upper
bound K H¯
X
p
(1−ρ)(1−α) .
In Corollary 6, the choice of Hk has an impact both on ρ and on the `p-sensitivity bound. In-
creasing the gains Hk can help decrease the contraction rate ρ to obtain a more rapidly converging
observer, but at the same time it increases the sensitivity, in the sense of Section 2.3, and thus the
level of noise necessary for differential privacy. Hence, in general, we should try to achieve a rea-
sonable contraction rate ρ with the smallest gain possible. We conclude this section with two more
corollaries, describing differentially private observers with output perturbation.
Corollary 7. Let P = diag(p), with pi > 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, and assume that the conditions of Corollary
6 are satisfied for the weighted 1-norm |Pv|1 =
∑n
i=1 pi|vi| onX. Consider the signal xˆk = zk+ξk,
where zk is computed from (4.6), and ξk,i are iid Laplace random variables with parameters b/pi,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, where
(4.10) b =
B1 supk ‖PHk‖1
(1− ρ) .
Then this signal xˆk is -differentially private for the adjacency relation (2.5) with p = 1, and for
(2.6) with p = 1 when B1 = K1−α .
Proof. From the bound (4.8) for p = 1, since ‖z − z‖1,X =
∑∞
k=0 |P (zk − z˜k)|1 we deduce by
Theorem 1 that Pzk + ζk is a differentially private signal, where ζk has Laplace distributed iid
components with the parameter b. Hence P−1(Pzk + ζk) is also differentially private (by resilience
to post-processing[15]) and we define ξk = P−1ζk in the Corollary. 
Corollary 8. Let P be a positive definite matrix, and assume that the conditions of Corollary 6
are satisfied for the weighted 2-norm |P 1/2v|2 on X. Consider the signal xˆk = zk + ξk, where zk
is computed from (4.6), and ξk is a Gaussian white noise with covariance matrix σ2P−1, where
σ = κδ,K2 supk ‖P 1/2Hk‖2. Then this signal xˆk is (, δ)-differentially private for the adjacency
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relation (2.5) with p = 2 if K2 = B2/(1 − ρ), and for the adjacency relation (2.6) with p = 2 if
K2 =
K
|ρ−α|
(∑
k≥0(ρ
k − αk)2
)1/2
.
Proof. From the bounds (4.8) or (4.9), we deduce by Theorem 1 that P 1/2zk + ζk is a differ-
entially private signal, where ζk is a Gaussian white noise with covariance matrix σ2I . Hence
P−1/2(P 1/2zk + ζk) is also differentially private (by resilience to post-processing[15]) and we de-
fine ξk = P−1/2ζk in the Corollary. 
Corollaries 7 and 8 give two differentially private mechanisms with output perturbation, provided
we can design the matrices H¯k to verify the assumptions of Corollary 6 with the (weighted) 1- or
2-norm on X. The next section discusses application examples for the privacy-preserving observer
design methodology.
5. EXAMPLES
5.1. Estimating Link Formation Preferences in Dynamic Social Networks. Statistical studies
of networks have intensified tremendously in recent years, with one motivating application being the
emergence of online social networking communities. In this section we focus on a recently proposed
state-space model[36] describing the dynamics of link formation in networks, called the Dynamic
Stochastic Blockmodel. It combines a linear state-space model for the underlying dynamics of
the network and the classical stochastic blockmodel of Holland et al. [37], resulting in a nonlinear
measurement equation. Examples of applications of this model include mining email and cell phone
databases [36], which obviously contain privacy-sensitive data.
Consider a set of n nodes. Each node corresponds to an individual and can belong to one of N
classes. Let θabk be the probability of forming an edge at time k between a node in class a and a
node in class b, and let θk denote the vector of probabilities [θabk ]1≤a,b≤N . For example, edges could
represent email exchanges or phone conversations. Edges are assumed to be formed independently
of each other according to θk. Let yabk =
mabk
nab
be the observed density of edges between classes
a and b, where mabk is the number of observed edges between classes a and b at time k, and n
ab
is the maximum possible number of edges between these two classes. For simplicity, we assume
that the quantities nab are publicly known (this is the case, for example, if the class of each node
is public information), and we focus on the problem of estimating the parameters θabk by using the
signals yabk . This corresponds to the “a priori” blockmodeling setting[37, 36]. The links formed
between specific nodes constitute private information however, so directly releasing mabk or y
ab
k or
an estimate of θk based on these quantities is not allowed.
If nab is large enough, previous work has argued[36] using the Central Limit Theorem that an
approximate model where yabk is Gaussian is justified, so that
(5.1) yk = θk + vk,
where vk is a Gaussian noise vector with diagonal covariance matrix Vk (whose entries theoretically
should depend on θk, but this aspect is neglected in the model). Rather than defining a dynamic
model for θk, whose entries are constrained to be between 0 and 1, let us redefine the state vector
to be the so-called logit of θk, denoted ψk, with entries ψabk = ln
θabk
1−θabk
, which are well defined for
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0 < θabk < 1. The dynamics of ψk is assumed to be linear
ψk+1 = Fψk + wk,(5.2)
for some known matrix F , and for noise vectors wk assumed to be iid Gaussian with known covari-
ance matrix W [36]. The observation model (5.1) now becomes
(5.3) yk = g(ψk) + vk,
where the components of g are given by the logistic function applied to each entry of ψ, i.e.,
gab(ψk) =
1
(1 + e−ψabk )
.
An Extended Kalman Filter (EKF) is proposed in [36] to estimate ψ, but we pursue here a de-
terministic observer design to illustrate the ideas discussed in the previous sections. Hence, for
simplicity we consider an observer of the form
ψˆk+1 = Fψˆk +H(yk − g(ψˆk)) = (Fψˆk −Hg(ψˆk)) +Hyk,
with H a constant square gain matrix. To enforce contraction as in Corolloary 6, we should choose
H so that ‖F − HG(ψ)‖ ≤ ρ, where G(ψ) is the Jacobian of g at ψ. Note that G(ψ) is a square
and diagonal matrix with entries Gii(ψ) = e
−ψi
(1+e−ψi )2
, with i indexing the pairs (a, b). The only
nonlinearity in the model (5.2), (5.3) comes from the observation model (5.3).
To further simplify the following discussion, let us assume that F is also diagonal (an assumption
also made in previous work[36], where the coupling between components occurs only through the
non-diagonal covariance matrix W ). In this case, the systems completely decouple into scalar
systems, and it is natural to choose H to be diagonal as well. The observer for one of these scalar
system takes the form
zk+1 = fzk + h×
(
yk − 1
1 + e−zk
)
= fzk − h
1 + e−zk
+ hyk,(5.4)
where h ∈ R is the observer gain to set, f ∈ R+, zk ∈ R is one component (a, b) of ψˆk and yk now
represents just the corresponding scalar component of the measurement vector as well. Since the
state space X is now R, the norm | · |X is simply the absolute value. The contraction condition (4.7)
reads, for some 0 < ρ < 1,
−ρ ≤ f − h e
−z
(1 + e−z)2
≤ ρ(5.5)
i.e., f − ρ ≤ h e
−z
(1 + e−z)2
≤ f + ρ.(5.6)
Now note that 0 ≤ e−z
(1+e−z)2 ≤ 14 for all z. Hence, by taking h ≤ 4(f +ρ), the right inequality (5.6)
is satisfied. To satisfy the left inequality, if f < 1, we could potentially take ρ ≥ f , although the
estimation performance might not necessarily be satisfying in this case. Alternatively, if f ≥ 1 or
if we want to achieve a smaller contraction parameter ρ than the value of f , we can enforce the left
inequality on a subset of the state-space. Namely, for −a ≤ z ≤ a, we have e−z
(1+e−z)2 ≥ e
−a
(1+e−a)2 .
In this case, for ρ < f , by taking h ≥ (f − ρ)ea(1 + e−a)2, the left hand side of (5.6) is also
satisfied.
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Suppose for example that f = 1 in the dynamics (5.4), so that (5.2) describes a Gaussian random
walk, and that the adjacency relation considered is (2.6). By Corollary 7, we can publish an -
differentially private estimate of ψ by computing zk using (5.4) and adding Laplace noise to it with
parameter b = Kh/((1 − ρ)(1 − α)). Small noise requires small values of h and of ρ. Since we
must take ρ < 1, we cannot enforce the left inequality of (5.6) for all values of z. Suppose then that
we want to design a privacy-preserving observer assuming that θ remains in the interval [0.1, 0.9],
or equivalently ψ ∈ [−2.197, 2.197] approximately. In this interval, we have 0.09 ≤ e−ψ
(1+e−ψ)2 ≤ 14 ,
and so ρ and h must also satisfy
(5.7)
f − ρ
0.09
≤ h ≤ 4(f + ρ), i.e., 1− ρ
0.09
≤ h ≤ 4(1 + ρ).
Note in particular that the factor h/(1 − ρ) also appearing in the parameter b is lower bounded by
1/0.09 ≈ 11.1. We should then set h = (1 − ρ)/0.09, satisfying the left inequality in (5.7) with
equality, for the value of the contraction parameter ρ that we want to achieve. For example, for
faster observer convergence we should try to achieve the lowest possible value of ρ, although this
might amplify the steady-state variance due to measurement noise. The inequalities (5.7) can only
be satisfied for ρ ' 0.47, a contraction parameter that can then be achieved by taking h ≈ 5.88.
Figure 2 illustrates the behavior of the privacy-preserving observer, when the privacy parameters
are  = ln(3), δ = 0 and K = 3× 10−3 and α = 0.25 in (2.6). That is, for the pair of classes (a, b)
under consideration, we want to provide a differential privacy guarantee making it hard to detect a
transient variation in the number of edges, as long as this variation represents initially at most 0.3%
of all the edges between classes a and b, and subsequently decreases at least geometrically with rate
1/4. Concretely, if edges represent phone conversations for example, this means that if an individual
in class a suddenly increases his call volume with class b but by an amount representing less than a
proportion K of all calls between a and b, and subsequently reduces this temporary activity at rate
α, then an adversary having access to a differentially private estimate of θabk . can only achieve a
low probability of correctly detecting this event[38].
As explained in Figure 1, it can be useful to further filter the differentially private signal produced
above, since this signal exposes directly the privacy-preserving noise. In this case, one can interpret
the private estimate z˜k = zk+ξk, with ξ the Laplace noise as in Corollary 7, as a noisy measurement
of ψ, now with a trivial, linear measurement model in contrast to (5.3). A possible simple post-filter
smoothing z˜k can then be the linear observer
ψˆk+1 = fψˆk + kpost(z˜k − fψˆk),
and Figure 2 also represents θˆk = g(ψˆk) for the gain value kpost = 0.4.
5.2. Syndromic Surveillance. Syndromic surveillance systems monitor health related data in real-
time in a population to facilitate early detection of epidemic outbreaks [39]. In particular, recent
studies have shown the correlation between certain non-medical data, e.g., search engine queries
related to a specific disease, and the proportion of individuals infected by this disease in the popula-
tion [40]. Although time series analysis can be used to detect abnormal patterns in the collected data
[39], here we focus on a model-based filtering approach [41], and develop a differentially private
observer for a 2-dimensional epidemiological model.
The following SIR model of Kermack and McKendrick [42, 43] models the evolution of an
epidemic in a population by dividing individuals into 3 categories: susceptible (S), i.e., individuals
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FIGURE 2. Sample path of the estimate of the edge formation probability θabk , for
some classes (a, b). The measured edge density is generated from one component
of the model (5.1), (5.2) with f = 1 and wk, vk iid Gaussian random variables
with zero mean and standard deviation 0.03 and 0.04 respectively. The trajectory
θ (dotted line) starts at the value 0.65, and the observers are all initialized at the
value 0.50. The upper bound ρ on the contraction rate of the observer (5.4) is set
to ρ = 0.9, providing a good tradeoff between convergence speed and steady-state
variance (see green dashed curve for the non-private observer), with corresponding
gain h = 1.11. The dot-dashed line shows 1/(1+exp(−z˜k)) as our private estimate
of θk, where z˜k is a ln(3)-differentially private estimate of ψk (hence, the estimate
of θk is also ln(3)-differentially private), obtained by the Laplace mechanism, for
the adjacency relation (2.6) with parameter values K = 3 × 10−3, α = 0.25. We
also show a differentially private estimate obtained after further post-filtering, as
explained in the main text.
who might become infected if exposed; infectious (I), i.e., currently infected individuals who can
transmit the infection; and recovered (R) individuals, who are immune to the infection. A simple
version of the model in continuous-time includes bilinear terms and reads
ds
dt
= −µRois
di
dt
= µRois− µi.
Here i and s represent the proportion of the total population in the classes I and S. The last class R
need not be included in this model because we have the constraint i+ s+ r = 1. The parameterRo
is called the basic reproduction number and represents the average number of individuals infected
by a sick person. The epidemic can propagate when Ro > 1. The parameter µ represents the rate
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at which infectious people recover and move to the class R. More details about this model can be
found in [43].
Discretizing this model with sampling period τ , we get the discrete-time model
sk+1 = sk − τµRoiksk + w1,k = f1(sk, ik) + w1,k(5.8)
ik+1 = ik + τµik(Rosk − 1) + w2,k = f2(sk, ik) + w2,k,(5.9)
where we have also introduced noise signals w1 and w2 in the dynamics. We assume here for
simplicity that we can collect syndromic data providing a noisy measurement of the proportion of
infected individuals, .i.e.,
yk = ik + vk,
where vk is a noise signal. We can then consider the design of an observer of the form
sˆk+1 = f1(sˆk, iˆk) + h1(yk − iˆk)
iˆk+1 = f2(sˆk, iˆk) + h2(yk − iˆk).
We define the Jacobian matrix of the system (5.8), (5.9)
F (s, i) = I2 + τµRo
[−i −s
i s− 1/Ro
]
,
as well as the gain matrix H = [h1, h2]T and observation matrix C = [0, 1]. Here, we design a
differentially private observer with Gaussian noise using Corollolary 8, for the adjacency relation
(2.6) with p = 2.
Following Corollary 3, the contraction rate constraint (4.7) for a 2-norm on R2 weighted by a
matrix P  0 is equivalent to the family of inequalities, for all (s, i) in the region of [0, 1]2 where
we want to show contraction
(F (s, i)−HC)TP (F (s, i)−HC)  ρ2P
F Tx PFx − F Tx PHC − CTHTPFx + CTHTPHC  ρ2P,
where we used Fx := F (s, i) to simplify the notation. Defining the new variable X = PH , this
can be rewritten
F Tx PFx − F Tx XC − CTXTFx + CTXTP−1XC  ρ2P,
which, using the Schur complement, is equivalent to the family of LMIs
(5.10)
[
ρ2P − F Tx PFx + F Tx XC + CTXTFx CTXT
XC P
]
 0,
for all x = (s, i) in the region where we want to prove contraction. If we can find P,X satisfying
these inequalities, we recover the observer gain vector simply as H = P−1X .
For a given value of ρ, the covariance matrix of the Gaussian noise in Corollary 8 is proportional
to ‖P 1/2H‖22P−1 = (HTPH)P−1 = (XTP−1X)P−1, and hence it is advantageous to minimize
a function of this matrix. Note that XTP−1X is a scalar. Minimizing (XTP−1X) Tr(P−1) does
not appear to directly lead to an efficiently solvable optimization problem, but as a proxy we can
choose to minimize instead the sum XTP−1X + νTr(P−1), for some tuning parameter ν. After
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FIGURE 3. Sample path of the estimate of the percentage of infectious people over
time produced by the observer. The standard deviations for the dynamics and mea-
surement noise were set to σwkI2 = 0.005
√
τI2 and σvk = 0.02 respectively. The
signals were truncated to maintain positive values for i, s, y in the simulation. The
true proportion of infectious people starts at 0.5%, whereas the estimate used to
initialize the observer is 1%. The output of the differentially private observer is not
filtered.
taking Schur complements, this leads to the following semidefinite program, for a given value of
the contraction parameter ρ
min
Σ0,λ≥0,P0,X
λ+ ν Tr(Σ)
subject to
[
λ XT
X P
]
 0,
[
Σ I2
I2 P
]
 0, and (5.10).
Alternatively, one can minimize λTr(Σ) for fixed values of λ subject to the constraints above and
perform a one-dimensional search for a minimizing value of λ.
Example 2. Let us assume µ = 0.1, Ro = 2, τ = 0.1, K = 10−3, α = 0.25 in (2.6), and  = 2,
δ = 0.05. That is, we wish to provide a (2, 0.05)-differential privacy guarantee for maximum
deviations of 0.1% (see the discussion in the previous subsection). Although not a perfectly rigor-
ous contraction certificate, we sample the continuous set of constraints (5.10) by sampling the set
{(s, i)|0.01 ≤ i ≤ 0.25, 0.01 ≤ s ≤ 1 − i} at the values of s, i multiple of 0.01, to obtain a finite
number of LMIs. A more rigorous approach to enforce these constraints could make use of sum-of-
squares programming [44]. Following the procedure above, for the choice ρ = 0.996, we obtain the
observer gain H = [3.9304; 0.2003] and the covariance matrix Σ with Σ1/2 =
[
691 22
22 17
]
× 10−4
for the privacy-preserving Gaussian noise. Sample trajectories of the non-private and private (non-
smoothed) estimates of i are shown on Fig. 3.
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6. CONCLUSION
This paper introduces a design methodology for nonlinear observer design, which provides dif-
ferential privacy guarantees when the measured signals are privacy sensitive, by perturbing the
published output signal of the observer. Tools from contraction analysis are used both to enforce
convergence of the observer and to set the level of output noise necessary in order to provide the
differential privacy guarantee. More concretely, we bound the sensitivity of the observers by lever-
aging a robustness property of contractive systems. The observer design methodology is illustrated
through two examples where we construct estimators for models with nonlinear dynamics or mea-
surements.
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